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DIRECTOR OF CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE

**Security Committee**

SECOM-M-231

3 March 1980

Minutes

Two Hundred and Twenty-eighth Meeting  
Wednesday, 27 February 1980, 1000-1200 Hours  
Room 7E62, Langley Headquarters Building

[REDACTED]  
Acting Chairman  
Presiding

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MEMBERS PRESENT

[REDACTED]  
Col. Herbert Kamm, Department of the Air Force  
Mr. Merrill T. Kelly, Department of the Army

[REDACTED]  
Mr. D. Jerry Rubino, Department of Justice  
Mr. Dennis Southern, Department of the Treasury  
Mr. Richard L. Welch, Department of the Navy

ALTERNATES PRESENT

Mr. Gerald Berkin, Department of the Navy  
Mr. James W. Gerblich, Federal Bureau of Investigation  
Mr. David Humphrey, Department of the Treasury/Secret Service  
Mr. David McCabe, Department of State

ALSO PRESENT

Mr. Maynard C. Anderson, Office of Secretary of Defense

[REDACTED]  
Mr. Michael N. Cassetta, Department of Commerce  
Mr. Cyril F. Frank, Justice/Drug Enforcement Agency

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Mr. Donald Stigers, Department of State

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PRELIMINARY COMMENTS

1. The Acting Chairman advised members of two briefings given the NSC Special Coordination Committee (SCC) and its Counterintelligence Working Group (CIWG). On 5 February Mr. Gambino described for the SCC/CIWG differences in Government personnel security investigative and clearance standards, discussed their counterintelligence implications, and assessed prospects for resolving problems. This briefing was designed to focus senior level attention on the personnel security aspects of broad dissemination of formerly compartmented information released at the collateral level as a result of the APEX system. As a

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entire Government. On 14 February, [REDACTED] briefed the SCC on possible polygraph examinations of U.S. workers on the new Moscow Embassy after their return from the USSR. He advised that this had been urged by the DCI for some 125 U.S. personnel who would be performing key security tasks or constructing sensitive embassy areas. [REDACTED]

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the proposed questions focused only on counterintelligence matters, and commented that polygraph examinations of this type had met with high subject acceptance in reinvestigation programs at CIA and in industry. [REDACTED] said the

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2. The Acting Chairman advised of a General Accounting Office survey of contractors for statistical data on SCI and collateral "carve-out" contracts. 600-700 contractors are being considered as a representative sample in what appears to be a classification management study. It was

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noted that NSA and Defense industrial security offices had concurred in putting out guidance on this matter. Responses are optional and contractors should be referred to security elements if they have questions. [ ]

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3. The Acting Chairman advised that the DCI's Special Assistant for Compartmentation was moving promptly toward implementation of the APEX System. The 4C system was being addressed. A 16-minute audio-visual presentation on APEX has been developed for core use in educational/orientation programs. The scope of the educational needs to introduce APEX in Government and Industry were being sized by panels of the APEX Steering Group. In the ensuing discussion it was noted that many members of SECOM are heavily engaged in the APEX implementation effort. Those persons emphasized that all members could support the effort by ensuring that their senior management understood the importance and need to commit good personnel and sufficient resources to APEX implementation. It was also noted that benefits could accrue to the Government if SCI contractor support was enlisted on a partnership basis in the implementation endeavors. [ ]

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4. [ ] invited members who wished to remain after the formal meeting to see the slide-tape security orientation for senior officials developed by the Committee's Security Awareness Working Group. He commended the quality of this effort, and advised that the presentation had been shown to the DCI's Special Assistant for Counterintelligence who had asked that dissemination by the Committee be deferred until he could show it to the DCI and get his endorsement. [ ] said member comments were particularly desired on whether the presentation was effectively keyed to senior officials. [ ]

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5. The Acting Chairman advised that [ ] chief of the staff's Compartmentation Branch, was retiring on 29 February. He commended [ ] for his service to the Committee and thanked him for his contributions to implementation of the APEX system. [ ]

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ITEM 1: Approval of Minutes

25X1 The minutes of the 30 January 1980 meeting were approved as written. [ ]

ITEM 2: Subcommittee and Working Group Reports

25X1 a. Compartmentation - [ ] advised that he and his members were closely involved in APEX implementation.

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25X1A b. R&D - [ ] said their report on document destruction would be completed and distributed soon. He noted that a key element in a meaningful emergency destruction plan was reduction in the amount of paper held by field offices. [ ]

25X1 c. TSCS - [ ] advised that there were as yet no positive responses to the earlier request for Community agencies to help provide training equipment for the ITC. Several members said they were still actively exploring the issue. Note was taken of the retirement of Mr. Breidenfeld, the FBI member of the TSCS. [ ]

25X1A d. Security Awareness - [ ] reported they had made a budget submission for FY 1982 to seek adequate resources for an effective Community security orientation program. [ ] advised that he had proposed a DCI budget, separate from the unclassified Intelligence Community Staff one, to cover Community security requirements. He asked members to submit candidate programs for inclusion.

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e. Security Advisory Group USSR - Mr. McCabe reported that 3 shelters for use by security personnel at the new Moscow embassy site are to be airlifted to Helsinki in mid-March and escorted to Moscow as diplomatic cargo. He noted that the Soviets were installing the perimeter fence, and that the U.S. had directed a halt to further Soviet construction until the fence was completed. He said 4 Marine guards were on site, with additional security personnel en route. Mr. McCabe advised that the issue of

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whether the Soviets could have sole possession of U.S. materials for customs inspection was still open.

[ ] said efforts to secure adequate R&D funds were still unresolved. He noted that a meeting on this subject had been held with Mr. Donahue, OMB. [ ]

f. Investigative Standards - Mr. McCabe advised that their report should be ready for the printers in about a week. [ ] expressed his best wishes to Mr. McCabe on his retirement, and thanked him for his services to the Committee. [ ]

### ITEM 3: Proposed Secrecy Agreement

The Acting Chairman referred to the proposed secrecy agreement sent to members earlier (SECOM-D-077, dated 6 February 1980), which was developed by the Compartmentation Subcommittee in response to tasking to review the current version (Form 4066, Nondisclosure Agreement for SCI) and to develop a model for Community use. He noted that the object was an agreement in everyday language covering elements deemed legally necessary for use as a minimum form in the Community. [ ] said the proposed agreement would be an instrument for access, to be supplemented in those agencies where employment was the consideration. He asked NSA to elaborate on their dissenting views to the proposal. [ ] NSA Office of General Counsel, said NSA did not believe the proposal could be a uniform model, and that they saw a need for agencies to be able to address elements to meet individual requirements. He noted that the recent Supreme Court ruling in the [ ] case provided some much needed legal guidance on this issue. [ ] said they would like the proposal referred to Community General Counsels for legal analysis in the light of the [ ] ruling. Mr. Rubino, Justice, said his department wanted a similar analysis done. [ ] advised that NSA would like to see a Community agreement that required protection of unclassified as well as classified data. He referred to P.L. 86-36 as applicable to NSA interests in this regard, and to DCI statutory responsibilities for protection of sources and methods (50 USC 403(d)). [ ] emphasized that the goal was a composite agreement to satisfy basic Community needs in the APEX arena, permitting internal agency supplements to cover unique circumstances. Members agreed that General Counsel review was essential in this area, but differed on whether the existing 4066 or the

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proposal under discussion should be used in the interim. After further discussion, the Acting Chairman determined that the consensus was that Community agencies would use their choice of the two to satisfy APEX implementation requirements until the DCI General Counsel, in consultation with Community counterparts, could provide a legal analysis and recommendations. [ ] said such analysis would be requested on a priority basis. It was subsequently learned that the Chairman, APEX Control Group had already submitted this draft to the DCI's General Counsel. The SECOM staff will insure that the draft is brought to the attention of Mr. Silver with SECOM members comments.

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[ ] distributed copies of a DIA suggested revision of the proposed new agreement. [ ]

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ITEM 4: SECOM Seminar

The Acting Chairman advised that in the absence of an appointment by the DCI of a new Director of Security, CIA and Chairman, SECOM, it was felt to be prudent to postpone the Committee seminar schedule for 1-3 April.

[ ] said he hoped consideration would be given to re-scheduling the seminar for a later period, possibly in early fall. He said member suggestions on agenda topics were still encouraged and welcomed, and noted that they were helpful in focusing our attention on key issues. [ ]

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ITEM 5: Old Business

The Acting Chairman referred to discussion at the 30 January SECOM meeting on travel security policy, and asked members to read and comment on the issues and options paper prepared by the staff on this matter (SECOM-D-098, dated 25 February 1980). [ ] NSA, said agency requirements differed on this subject to such an extent that a uniform policy wasn't feasible. He suggested that current policy in DCID 1/20 permitted necessary agency flexibility. [ ] suggested the need for collection of relevant data at a central point. The members' consensus was to abide by present policy, defer Community action on

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any new pronouncement at this time and refer to a central point any indication of changes in foreign attitudes toward unofficial travelers (option "c" of the paper). The staff will provide members with a separate memorandum on this matter. [ ]

ITEM 6: New Business

a. The Acting Chairman asked the NSA member to summarize the conference on investigative standards sponsored by Defense in Richmond the previous week.


[ ] said the conference highlighted differences between adjudicators and attorneys on dealing with relevant personnel security information. He noted that presentations by psychiatrists were good, and suggested the usefulness of their being asked to help investigators formulate questions for use in personnel security investigations.

[ ] said the psychiatrists emphasized that they were not equipped to make security judgments. Mr. McCabe, State, suggested that unresolved issues in personnel security likely could not be dealt with effectively until E.O. 10450 was replaced with policy guidance dealing exclusively with national security considerations as opposed to blending them with suitability ones. [ ] emphasized that restrictions placed in recent years on FBI investigations and record holdings sharply limited the amount of relevant information the Bureau could provide for personnel security determinations. [ ]

b. Mr. Rubino, Justice, advised that he and his staff had recently been able to review some of the 80 boxes of documents seized as evidence in the Scientology case. He noted that about 20 of these boxes had been made available for public inspection, and that national security classified material had been found in this group of documents. Mr. Rubino said he had advised the Information Security Oversight Office of this, and noted that they were reviewing the documents now. He said that while some of the documents had been screened for classified material and originators advised, there were no assurances that this had been done for all the evidence. He invited other agencies to help with the review process. Mr. Rubino




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
distributed copies of a Scientology document included in the seized evidence which provided advice on how to go about breaking and entering secured offices and storage containers for the purpose of stealing documents or making unauthorized copies of them. 

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ITEM 7: Next Meeting

The Acting Chairman scheduled the next regular meeting of the Committee for Wednesday, 2 April 1980, at CIA Headquarters. 

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